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Abstract:	  The	  failure	  of	  psychiatry	  to	  validate	  its	  diagnostic	  constructs	  is	   often	   attributed	   to	   the	   prioritizing	   of	   reliability	   over	   validity	   in	   the	  structure	  and	  content	  of	  the	  Diagnostic	  and	  Statistical	  Manual	  of	  Mental	  
Disorders	  (DSM).	  Here	  I	  argue	  that	  in	  fact	  what	  has	  retarded	  biomedical	  approaches	   to	   psychopathology	   is	   unwarranted	   optimism	   about	  
diagnostic	   discrimination:	   the	   assumption	   that	   our	   diagnostic	   tests	  group	   patients	   together	   in	   ways	   that	   allow	   for	   relevant	   facts	   about	  mental	   disorder	   to	   be	   discovered.	   I	   consider	   the	   Research	   Domain	  Criteria	  (RDoC)	  framework	  as	  a	  new	  paradigm	  for	  classifying	  objects	  of	  psychiatric	   research	   that	   solves	   some	  of	   the	   challenges	  brought	  on	  by	  this	  assumption.	  	  	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  	   It	  is	  often	  said	  that	  the	  architects	  of	  the	  third	  edition	  of	  the	  Diagnostic	  and	  
Statistical	  Manual	  of	  Mental	  Disorders	  (1980),	  a	  task	  force	  of	  the	  American	  Psychiatric	  Association	  (APA),	  sacrificed	  validity	  for	  reliability	  when	  constructing	  the	  manual’s	  categories	  (Vaillant	  1984;	  Andreasen	  2007).	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  the	  DSM	  went	  wrong	  when	  it	  adopted	  an	  operationalist	  stance	  focusing	  on	  atheoretical	  observational	  criteria,	  an	  ecumenical	  approach	  that	  made	  applying	  diagnoses	  simple	  but	  learning	  about	  them	  difficult.	  Without	  an	  understanding	  of	  underlying	  mechanisms,	  some	  believe,	  psychiatry	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  identify	  disease	  entities	  akin	  to	  those	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  medicine	  (Murphy	  2006).	  	  This	  narrative	  suggests	  that	  psychiatrists	  were	  forced	  to	  adopt	  the	  DSM’s	  operationalism,	  and	  became	  uninterested	  in	  or	  unable	  to	  pursue	  etiological	  explanations.	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   A	  better	  way	  to	  put	  it	  is	  that	  psychiatrists	  have	  followed	  the	  DSM	  in	  assuming	  that	  reliability	  will	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  validity	  —	  that	  is,	  that	  reliable	  diagnostic	  categories	  will	  demarcate	  the	  best	  targets	  for	  validation.	  Here	  I	  argue	  that	  rather	  than	  the	  commitment	  to	  operationalism,	  what	  has	  been	  most	  detrimental	  to	  research	  has	  been	  psychiatry’s	  deference	  to	  the	  nosological	  project	  itself.	  The	  DSM’s	  unfortunate	  bequest	  to	  twentieth-­‐	  and	  twenty-­‐first-­‐century	  psychiatry	  has	  been	  its	  commitment	  to	  the	  assumption	  of	  diagnostic	  
discrimination,	  which	  I	  define	  as	  the	  assumption	  that	  our	  diagnostic	  tests1	  group	  patients	  
together	  in	  ways	  that	  allow	  for	  relevant	  facts	  about	  mental	  disorder	  to	  be	  discovered.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  discussion,	  relevant	  facts	  are	  those	  about	  the	  underlying	  mechanisms	  causing	  the	  signs	  and	  symptoms	  that	  patients	  present	  with,	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  biomedical	  researchers	  hope	  to	  find:	  genetic	  signatures,	  neurological	  or	  cognitive	  dysfunctions,	  focal	  brain	  lesions,	  etc.	  	  Facts,	  in	  other	  words,	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  scientific	  project	  of	  “mapping	  the	  domain”	  of	  mental	  illness	  (Poland	  and	  Eckardt	  2013).	  	  	   I	  borrow	  the	  term	  discrimination	  from	  psychometrics,	  where	  it	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  statistical	  assessment	  of	  how	  a	  diagnostic	  test	  compares	  with	  a	  gold-­‐standard,	  measured	  by	  the	  test’s	  specificity,	  sensitivity,	  predictive	  value,	  and	  likelihood	  ratios	  (Knottnerus	  and	  Buntinx	  2009).	  In	  my	  argument,	  however,	  discrimination	  is	  invoked	  as	  an	  aspirational	  term,	  signifying	  an	  ideal	  rather	  than	  a	  measure:	  I	  make	  the	  case	  that	  while	  there	  is	  often	  no	  ground	  on	  which	  to	  judge	  diagnostic	  criteria	  as	  discriminative	  for	  research	  purposes,	  they	  are	  often	  assumed	  to	  be	  so	  anyway.	  It	  is,	  of	  course,	  an	  empirical	  question	  to	  what	  extent	  any	  DSM	  criteria	  facilitate	  or	  hinder	  scientific	  progress.	  	  My	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  offer	  any	  empirical	  
                                            
1 By “tests” I refer to either the diagnostic criteria of the DSM itself or diagnostic screens based 
on these criteria.  Obviously diagnostic discrimination could be proposed about other diagnostic 
methods (e.g., the Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual) but my focus here is on the DSM. 
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assessments	  but	  rather	  to	  argue	  that	  as	  long	  as	  diagnostic	  discrimination	  is	  broadly	  assumed,	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  psychiatric	  research	  will,	  on	  the	  whole,	  be	  hampered.	  	  	   The	  DSM’s	  central	  role	  in	  research,	  particularly	  in	  guiding	  the	  selection	  of	  test	  populations	  and	  establishing	  targets	  for	  explanation,	  is	  not	  only	  entrenched	  by	  historical	  precedent	  but	  also	  held	  firm	  by	  the	  hand	  of	  the	  biomedical	  marketplace,	  in	  which	  funding	  bodies	  prefer	  research	  that	  directly	  meets	  perceived	  clinical	  needs.	  	  This	  has	  led	  to	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  iterative	  validation	  of	  diagnostic	  constructs,	  especially	  the	  search	  for	  etiologies	  that	  can	  inspire	  new	  therapies,	  and	  the	  neglect	  of	  research	  that	  cross-­‐cuts	  or	  challenges	  existing	  diagnostic	  boundaries.	  If	  the	  DSM’s	  categories	  are	  discriminative	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense,	  such	  a	  narrowing	  of	  focus	  is	  a	  boon	  to	  research.	  If	  not,	  the	  DSM	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  lamppost	  in	  the	  tale	  of	  the	  man	  who	  makes	  the	  mistake	  of	  looking	  for	  his	  keys	  where	  the	  light	  is,	  instead	  of	  where	  he	  lost	  them.	  	  	   In	  the	  following	  section	  (2)	  I	  expand	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  diagnostic	  discrimination,	  and	  offer	  historical	  and	  empirical	  arguments	  for	  why	  we	  should	  be	  pessimistic	  about	  whether	  the	  DSM’s	  criteria	  are	  discriminative	  in	  the	  relevant	  way	  for	  biomedical	  research.	  	  While	  (as	  I	  suggest	  in	  my	  conclusions)	  most	  philosophers	  have	  not	  attended	  to	  the	  inhibiting	  and	  restrictive	  effects	  of	  the	  assumption	  of	  diagnostic	  discrimination,	  psychiatrists	  at	  the	  National	  Institute	  of	  Mental	  Health	  (NIMH)	  have	  recently	  recognized	  their	  importance.	  As	  I	  discuss	  in	  Section	  3,	  the	  organization	  has	  introduced	  an	  alternative	  classification	  system	  for	  psychiatric	  research,	  the	  Research	  Domain	  Criteria	  (RDoC)	  project,	  which	  aims	  to	  validate	  other	  sorts	  of	  constructs	  than	  diagnostic	  categories.	  I	  consider	  the	  RDoC	  here	  to	  show	  one	  way	  in	  which	  psychiatry	  could	  proceed	  which	  would	  justify	  a	  greater	  optimism	  about	  the	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discrimination	  of	  its	  measurements.	  In	  Section	  4	  I	  consider	  some	  possible	  responses	  to	  my	  argument.	  	  	  
2.	  The	  assumption	  of	  diagnostic	  discrimination	  in	  psychiatry	  	   In	  this	  section	  I	  explore	  whether	  the	  origins,	  structure,	  or	  performance	  of	  the	  DSM’s	  categories	  give	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  they	  categorize	  patients	  into	  groups	  about	  which	  facts	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  interest	  biomedical	  researchers	  can	  be	  gathered.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  first	  edition	  of	  the	  DSM	  (1952)	  was	  to	  collect	  statistical	  information,	  originally	  for	  military	  purposes.	  Ever	  since	  ambitious	  task	  forces	  have	  attempted	  to	  revise	  the	  DSM	  on	  to	  serve	  contemporary	  goals,	  rather	  than	  the	  needs	  of	  decades’	  old	  census	  projects.	  The	  architects	  of	  the	  DSM-­III	  prioritized	  the	  construction	  of	  diagnostic	  categories	  based	  on	  “distilled	  clinical	  research	  experience”	  as	  the	  “first	  and	  crucial	  taxonomic	  step”	  (Feighner	  et	  al.	  1972,	  57)	  towards	  identifying	  valid	  constructs.	  	  However	  Feighner	  et	  al.’s	  constructs	  were	  in	  fact	  an	  amalgam	  of	  data	  and	  received	  clinical	  intuition,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  basic	  taxonomic	  divisions	  were	  inherited	  unchallenged	  (Kendler	  2009).	  Similarly,	  the	  architects	  for	  the	  
DSM-­5	  announced	  the	  need	  to	  “transcend	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  current	  DSM	  paradigm”	  (Kupfer,	  First,	  and	  Regier	  2008	  p.	  xxii).	  In	  the	  end,	  however,	  with	  some	  exceptions,	  the	  nosological	  structure	  remained	  relatively	  stable.	  	  	   Turning	  to	  the	  manual’s	  structure,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  if	  etiopathogenic	  facts	  about	  mental	  disorders	  are	  forthcoming,	  they	  will	  not	  stand	  in	  simple	  causal	  relationships	  to	  the	  signs	  and	  symptoms	  that	  act	  as	  diagnostic	  criteria.	  	  As	  of	  its	  third	  edition	  the	  DSM’s	  categories	  have	  been	  polythetic,	  requiring	  patients	  to	  present	  with	  only	  n	  symptoms	  out	  of	  a	  longer	  list	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  threshold	  for	  the	  disorder.	  Pragmatic	  factors	  also	  increase	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heterogeneity;	  for	  example,	  screens	  for	  psychopathology	  tend	  to	  have	  low	  thresholds,	  since	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  false-­‐negative	  (abandoning	  a	  patient	  in	  need	  of	  care)	  is	  viewed	  as	  higher	  than	  a	  false-­‐positive	  (giving	  unneeded	  treatment)	  (Ross	  2014).	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  DSM’s	  criteria	  allow	  for	  incredible	  diversity	  —	  for	  example,	  the	  DSM-­5	  post-­‐traumatic	  stress	  disorder	  can	  be	  diagnosed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  636,120	  different	  combinations	  of	  symptoms	  (Olbert	  2014).	  This	  may	  mean	  that	  in	  fact	  conspecific	  patients	  have	  different	  underlying	  pathologies	  that	  cause	  these	  similar	  but	  distinct	  manifestations.	  	  Biomedical	  facts	  about	  patients	  sharing	  diagnoses	  will	  explain	  this	  diversity	  either	  by	  revealing	  the	  homogeneity	  beneath	  the	  promiscuity	  or	  by	  supplying	  disjunctive	  accounts	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  underlies	  it.	  	  	   Such	  symptomatic	  heterogeneity	  is	  frequently	  found	  among	  diagnostic	  conspecifics	  in	  other	  fields	  of	  medicine,	  such	  as	  cancer	  or	  lupus,	  and	  is	  not	  on	  its	  own	  evidence	  against	  discrimination	  –	  though	  it	  can	  certainly	  confound	  research	  (Millon	  and	  Klerman	  1986;	  Poland	  and	  Eckardt	  2013).	  But	  the	  lack	  of	  compelling	  confirmations	  of	  psychiatry’s	  taxonomic	  boundaries	  by	  genetics,	  epidimiology,	  neurophysiology,	  and	  other	  allied	  sciences	  is	  worrying,	  and	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  manual	  is	  useful	  for	  anything	  more	  than	  identifying	  phenotypic	  clusters.	  	  Taxometric	  and	  epidemiological	  studies	  reveal	  that	  the	  enormous	  heterogeneity	  in	  symptoms	  and	  course	  actually	  contain	  recognizable	  sub-­‐types	  that	  appear	  more	  frequently	  than	  others,	  but	  underlying	  differences	  in	  causal	  pathways	  or	  mechanisms	  that	  could	  explain	  these	  trends	  have	  not	  been	  found	  (Nandi,	  Beard,	  and	  Galea	  2009).	  	  	   Indeed,	  the	  biologization	  of	  psychiatric	  research	  has	  not	  led	  to	  the	  discovery	  of	  any	  laboratory	  markers	  for	  specific	  psychiatric	  conditions,	  and	  there	  remain	  no	  biological	  screens	  for	  psychopathology;	  only	  the	  checklists	  of	  the	  DSM	  and	  other	  manuals,	  and	  the	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tests	  based	  on	  their	  operationalizations.	  Decades	  of	  research	  into	  psychiatric	  and	  behavioral	  genetics	  has	  failed	  to	  turn	  up	  genes	  specific	  to	  particular	  disorders	  (though	  the	  heritability	  of	  types	  of	  psychopathology	  have	  been	  demonstrated	  (Merikangas	  and	  Risch	  2003))	  or	  neurological	  mechanisms	  (despite	  advances	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  neurological	  underpinnings	  of	  signs	  and	  symptoms	  (Gillihan	  and	  Parens	  2011)).	  	  The	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  has	  capitalized	  on	  optimism	  about	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  correspondence	  between	  diagnosis,	  underlying	  mechanism,	  and	  treatment	  —	  notable	  is	  frequent	  relabeling	  of	  treatments	  specific	  to	  symptoms	  (e.g.,	  “tranquilizers”)	  as	  treatments	  for	  purported	  disease	  entities	  (e.g.,	  “antipsychotics”)	  —	  but	  still	  nearly	  all	  psychopharmaceutical	  interventions	  remain	  nonspecific.	  	  	   All	  in	  all,	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  art	  in	  biomedical	  psychiatry	  cannot	  justify	  the	  assumption	  of	  diagnostic	  discrimination.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  review	  the	  claim,	  held	  by	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  psychiatrists,	  that	  the	  disappointing	  failure	  to	  validate	  the	  DSM’s	  constructs	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  to	  validate.	  Put	  in	  its	  strongest	  form,	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  psychiatric	  kinds	  being	  diagnosed	  by	  the	  manual	  are	  fictions,	  or,	  from	  the	  empiricist	  perspective,	  useless	  constructs.	  Or,	  in	  my	  metaphysically	  neutral	  terms,	  the	  diagnostic	  tests	  for	  these	  constructs	  are	  not	  discriminative	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  little	  of	  interest	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  biomedicine	  can	  be	  said	  about	  diagnostic	  conspecifics.	  	  
3.	  An	  epistemic	  bottleneck	  	   	  A	  valid	  taxonomy	  has	  long	  been	  viewed	  as	  the	  first	  step	  in	  psychiatric	  research.	  As	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  influential	  theorists	  of	  psychiatric	  validity	  have	  imagined	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a	  boot-­‐strapping	  model,	  in	  which	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  achieving	  validity	  is	  settling	  on	  a	  clinical	  description	  of	  diagnostic	  kinds.	  Andreasen,	  for	  example,	  writes	  that	  only	  “once	  a	  reliable	  method	  is	  applied	  to	  define	  symptoms	  or	  delineate	  a	  potential	  diagnostic	  category	  or	  dimension	  of	  psychopathology”	  can	  “these	  variables	  then	  be	  validated	  by	  examining	  their	  relationship	  to	  external	  measures”	  (Andreasen	  1995).	  	  The	  DSMs	  have,	  historically,	  provided	  the	  independent	  variable	  for	  studies	  attempting	  to	  validate	  psychiatric	  kinds.	  	   Recently,	  however,	  a	  new	  round	  of	  critics	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  test	  populations	  collected	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  their	  DSM	  diagnoses	  confounds	  progress,	  and	  some	  believe	  the	  best	  response	  is	  to	  do	  away	  entirely	  with	  diagnostic	  constructs	  as	  targets	  for	  validation	  (Hyman	  and	  Fenton	  2003;	  Merikangas	  and	  Risch	  2003).	  	  Their	  thought	  is	  that	  explanations	  that	  facilitate	  intervention	  and	  recovery	  are	  better	  found	  at	  other	  levels	  —	  for	  example,	  the	  level	  of	  the	  symptom,	  the	  gene,	  or	  the	  neural	  mechanism.	  Sanislow	  et	  al.	  have	  written	  that	  “dependence	  on	  conventional	  nosologies	  leaves	  the	  enterprise	  of	  understanding	  mechanisms	  of	  psychopathology	  in	  the	  awkward	  position	  of	  assuming	  the	  validity	  of	  single	  disorders	  and	  organizing	  research	  accordingly”	  (2012).	  	  	   Steven	  Hyman	  describes	  how,	  as	  the	  director	  of	  the	  NIMH	  in	  the	  late	  1990s,	  he	  became	  increasingly	  frustrated	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  research	  into	  treatments	  for	  the	  devastating	  cognitive	  deficits	  of	  schizophrenia.	  He	  realized	  taht	  the	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  cognitive	  symptoms	  was	  due	  to	  the	  bottleneck	  put	  on	  research	  by	  the	  DSM’s	  diagnostic	  criteria,	  which	  do	  not	  include	  cognitive	  deficits.	  “Given	  the	  status	  of	  the	  DSM-­‐IV	  criteria	  as	  the	  community	  consensus,”	  Hyman	  writes,	  “the	  U.S.	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration	  (FDA)	  held	  that	  it	  could	  not,	  by	  itself,	  recognize	  the	  cognitive	  symptoms	  of	  schizophrenia	  as	  an	  indication	  for	  the	  development	  and	  approval	  of	  new	  treatments”	  (Hyman	  2010,	  157).	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Recently,	  the	  DSM-­5	  Task	  Force	  has	  justified	  the	  continued	  lack	  of	  inclusion	  of	  cognitive	  symptoms	  quite	  explicitly,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  “cognition	  may	  not	  be	  useful	  as	  differential	  diagnosis	  tool.”2	  	  	   Hyman’s	  worry	  was	  that	  a	  vicious	  cycle	  is	  produced	  in	  which	  the	  exclusion	  of	  a	  symptom	  because	  it	  is	  not	  clinically	  useful	  leads	  to	  the	  suppression	  of	  precisely	  the	  kind	  of	  research	  that	  would	  make	  its	  saliency	  for	  psychiatric	  practice	  clear.	  	  More	  broadly,	  the	  requirement	  that	  signs	  or	  symptoms	  be	  studied	  within	  diagnostic	  constructs	  meant	  that	  it	  was	  hard	  to	  gather	  test	  populations	  that	  targeted	  objects	  of	  investigation	  below	  the	  level	  of	  the	  diagnosis.	  In	  2009,	  with	  his	  colleagues	  at	  the	  NIMH,	  Hyman	  began	  to	  construct	  a	  classification	  system	  for	  research,	  which	  would	  allow	  scientists	  to	  apply	  for	  funding	  from	  the	  Institute	  without	  structuring	  their	  studies	  around	  DSM	  categories.	  At	  stake	  with	  this	  new	  approach	  was	  the	  longstanding	  assumption	  that	  psychiatry’s	  scientific	  targets	  should	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  same	  set	  of	  diagnostic	  categories	  used	  in	  clinical	  practice.	  	  	   Under	  RDoC,	  instead	  of	  the	  DSM’s	  constructs	  psychiatric	  investigators	  present	  their	  experiments	  as	  targeting	  fundamental	  components	  of	  mental	  functioning,	  or	  “research	  domains,”	  that	  are	  drawn	  from	  allied	  sciences.	  These	  contribute	  one	  axis	  to	  the	  matrix	  that	  the	  NIMH	  has	  proposed	  to	  organize	  psychiatric	  research,	  which	  is	  sub-­‐divided	  into	  more	  specific	  “constructs”	  —	  for	  example,	  “reward	  valuation,”	  “performance	  monitoring,”	  or	  “attachment	  formation	  and	  maintenance.”	  The	  other	  axis	  is	  “units	  of	  analysis,”	  ranging	  from	  “genes”	  to	  “behavior.”	  	  By	  encouraging	  the	  funding	  of	  research	  that	  investigates	  a	  certain	  research	  domain(s)	  at	  a	  certain	  unit(s)	  of	  analysis,	  the	  RDoC	  changes	  the	  targets	  of	  validation	  from	  “clinical	  endpoints	  that	  have	  remained	  unchanged	  for	  decades”	  (Hyman	  
                                            
2 http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevision/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=411#. 
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and	  Fenton	  2003,	  351)	  to	  any	  sort	  of	  phenomenon	  relevant	  to	  psychopathology,	  either	  an	  extreme	  on	  a	  spectrum	  of	  human	  variation	  or	  a	  dysfunctional	  structure	  or	  process.	  	  	   Rather	  than	  seeking	  to	  replace	  the	  DSM	  as	  a	  diagnostic	  manual,	  RDoC	  is	  a	  classification	  protocol	  for	  researchers	  that	  aims	  to	  encourage	  a	  profound	  shift	  in	  the	  way	  research	  samples	  are	  conceived	  of	  and	  assembled.	  Instead	  of	  relying	  on	  DSM	  categories	  to	  gather	  research	  populations,	  NIMH	  researchers	  gather	  whatever	  populations	  are	  pertinent	  to	  their	  domain	  of	  interest.	  This	  method	  makes	  unnecessary	  the	  roundabouts	  researchers	  have	  always	  used	  to	  precisify	  generic	  diagnostic	  screens	  to	  meet	  their	  own	  needs	  (Meehl	  1986;	  Kutschenko	  2011a).	  One	  of	  the	  aims	  of	  RDoC	  is	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  patients	  typically	  ignored	  in	  research	  because	  they	  fall	  into	  an	  “not	  otherwise	  specified”	  category,	  or	  are	  below	  the	  threshold	  for	  diagnosis.	  So,	  for	  example,	  a	  group	  researching	  fear	  circuitry	  (construct	  of	  interest:	  fear/acute	  threat,	  domain:	  negative	  valence	  systems,	  unit:	  circuits)	  might	  use	  as	  their	  test	  population	  patients	  seeking	  medical	  help	  for	  anxiety,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  meet	  any	  specific	  diagnostic	  criteria.3	  	  	   The	  RDoC	  project	  avoids	  the	  pitfall	  of	  assuming	  diagnostic	  discrimination,	  although,	  as	  I	  discuss	  in	  Section	  4.3,	  it	  still	  relies	  on	  other	  types	  of	  discrimination	  that	  may	  be	  problematic.	  Of	  interest	  here	  is	  that	  in	  order	  to	  move	  psychiatric	  research	  beyond	  a	  limited	  set	  of	  targets,	  the	  NIMH	  has	  placed	  its	  bets	  for	  discriminative	  tests	  outside	  of	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  DSM,	  putting	  its	  faith	  in	  researchers	  to	  design	  experiments	  that	  use	  appropriate	  screens	  to	  investigate	  constructs	  relevant	  to	  psychopathology.	  While	  debates	  over	  which	  sorts	  of	  objects	  are	  most	  worthy	  of	  study	  may	  continue	  to	  be	  played	  out	  
                                            
3 This example is borrowed from the NIMH’s online materials about the RDOC — see 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/nimh-research-domain-criteria-
rdoc.shtml#toc_studies for the full example. Accessed 6/18/14. 
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through	  the	  distribution	  of	  funding	  dollars,	  these	  judgments	  will	  be	  constrained	  by	  current	  epistemological	  and	  methodological	  commitments	  rather	  than	  nosological	  tradition.	  	  	  	  
4.	  Some	  possible	  objections	  	   I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  DSM	  over	  psychiatric	  research	  should	  indeed	  be	  blamed,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  for	  the	  disappointing	  failure	  of	  psychiatric	  research	  to	  produce	  robust	  advances	  comparable	  to	  the	  other	  biomedical	  sciences.4	  	  This	  effect	  is	  due	  the	  assumption	  that	  diagnostic	  categories	  are	  the	  appropriate	  grounds	  on	  which	  to	  draw	  test	  populations	  for	  research	  purposes.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  consider	  three	  possible	  objections	  to	  my	  argument.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  warrant	  for	  the	  belief	  in	  diagnostic	  discrimination	  can	  be	  found	  in	  clinical	  practice.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  some	  assumptions	  about	  discrimination	  are	  impossible	  to	  avoid,	  and	  that	  its	  bottlenecking	  effects	  on	  progress	  are	  a	  necessary	  cost	  of	  the	  scientific	  method.	  The	  third	  is	  that	  by	  giving	  up	  on	  validating	  the	  DSM’s	  categories,	  psychiatry	  would	  lose	  track	  of	  its	  true	  targets.	  	  	  
4.1	  The	  Clinical	  Case	  for	  Diagnostic	  Discrimination	  	  	  It	  has	  been	  assumed	  that	  if	  clinicians	  are	  able	  to	  separate	  patients	  into	  discrete	  kinds	  based	  on	  their	  symptomology	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  anticipate	  that	  scientific	  validators	  will	  ultimately	  reinforce	  these	  divisions	  (Robins	  and	  Guze	  1970).	  However,	  studies	  of	  the	  actual	  usage	  of	  the	  manual	  suggest	  that	  clinicians	  find	  it	  primarily	  useful	  for	  securing	  treatment	  options,	  and	  mostly	  ignore	  its	  complex	  polythetic	  structure	  (First	  and	  Westen	  2007).	  Practitioners	  engage	  in	  diagnostic	  “bracket	  creep”	  to	  tweak	  coverage	  
                                            
4 There are, of course, other crucial factors here. The brain is more complex than other medical 
objects and that explanations of psychopathology from a biomedical perspective may always be 
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benefits	  and	  to	  duck	  the	  restrictions	  insurance	  companies	  put	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  utilize	  their	  expert	  judgment	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  DSM	  thresholds	  (Bowker	  and	  Star	  1999).	  	  In	  fact,	  ethnographic	  research	  reveals	  that	  diagnoses	  often	  come	  after	  treatment,	  rather	  than	  guiding	  it	  (Whooley	  2010,	  461).	  	  If	  the	  manual’s	  ubiquity	  in	  clinical	  practice	  is	  due	  to	  its	  integral	  role	  in	  the	  larger	  machinery	  of	  industrial	  and	  corporate	  healthcare	  rather	  than	  its	  accurate	  representation	  of	  clinical	  types,	  any	  argument	  for	  diagnostic	  discrimination	  on	  these	  grounds	  is	  unsound.	  	  	   Further	  evidence	  that	  the	  manual’s	  diagnostic	  constructs	  do	  not	  accurately	  represent	  clinical	  concepts	  of	  disorder	  comes	  from	  the	  widespread	  alarm	  over	  the	  deprecation	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  patient	  due	  to	  the	  DSM’s	  reductive	  approach	  to	  description	  (Andreasen	  2007).	  The	  DSM’s	  operationalized	  descriptions	  neglect	  the	  fact	  that	  patients	  “react	  to	  their	  abnormalities	  in	  all	  kinds	  of	  ways	  that	  may	  sometimes	  require	  the	  categories	  of	  meaning	  and	  experience	  in	  order	  to	  be	  understood	  or	  explained”	  (Sass,	  Parnas,	  and	  Zahavi	  2011,	  16).	  Some	  phenomenologically-­‐oriented	  clinicians	  and	  philosophers	  have	  suggested	  that	  these	  neglected	  aspects	  of	  mental	  illness	  should	  themselves	  be	  targets	  for	  validation	  ((Henriksen	  and	  Parnas	  2012;	  Parnas	  et	  al.	  2005).	  	  Taken	  together,	  these	  criticisms	  suggest	  that	  the	  DSM	  categories	  do	  not	  reflect	  the	  clinical	  picture	  sufficiently	  to	  justify	  optimism	  about	  their	  utility	  in	  the	  research	  setting.	  	  
4.2	  The	  inevitability	  of	  diagnostic	  discrimination	  	  	   Another	  possible	  objection	  is	  that	  the	  assumption	  of	  discrimination	  is	  inevitable	  in	  psychiatric	  investigation,	  and	  that	  the	  DSM	  is	  not	  (uniquely)	  culpable.	  Studies	  dividing	  subjects	  into	  groups	  must	  be	  always	  depend	  on	  tests	  assumed	  to	  be	  discriminative	  for	  the	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construct	  in	  question.	  Strategies	  like	  RDoC,	  it	  could	  be	  argued,	  simply	  replace	  the	  diagnostic	  constructs	  of	  the	  DSM	  with	  other	  sorts	  of	  constructs,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  sub-­‐categories	  of	  its	  proposed	  domains.	  The	  validity	  of	  these	  constructs	  can	  surely	  also	  be	  challenged,	  and	  the	  organization	  of	  research	  methods	  and	  practices	  in	  accordance	  with	  them	  could	  also	  be	  restrictive.	  	  	  My	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  dismiss	  the	  importance	  of	  discrimination	  in	  psychiatric	  research,	  nor	  to	  suggest	  that	  psychiatry	  can	  or	  should	  do	  without	  constructs	  altogether,	  but	  rather	  to	  challenge	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  DSM’s	  criteria	  are	  discriminative	  for	  research	  purposes.	  While	  the	  RDoC	  also	  relies	  on	  constructs,	  its	  architects	  have	  emphasized	  that	  these	  constructs	  are,	  first,	  completely	  open	  to	  revision	  and,	  second,	  explicitly	  designed	  to	  be	  broad	  enough	  to	  include	  the	  leading	  paradigms	  within	  psychiatric	  research.5	  Notably,	  RDoC	  does	  not	  limit	  the	  conceivable	  objects	  of	  psychiatric	  research	  –	  such	  as	  specific	  genes,	  or	  behaviors	  –	  only	  the	  loci	  on	  the	  matrix	  at	  which	  the	  objects	  fall.	  Accordingly,	  researchers	  have	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  autonomy	  in	  the	  design	  of	  their	  research,	  and	  (like	  in	  all	  scientific	  research)	  their	  choice	  of	  construct,	  and	  the	  tests	  they	  use	  to	  measure	  for	  it,	  should	  be	  scrutinized	  closely	  by	  their	  peers.	  	  
4.3	  The	  value	  of	  diagnostic	  kinds	  for	  psychiatric	  research	  	   A	  final	  objection	  worth	  considering	  is	  whether	  the	  gains	  to	  research	  productivity	  that	  would	  come	  from	  having	  discriminative	  targets	  have	  too	  high	  an	  epistemological	  or	  
                                                                                                                                             
psychology, the social sciences, and even the humanities. 
5 If	  the	  NIMH	  does	  not	  fulfill	  its	  promise	  to	  update	  the	  matrix’s,	  it	  could	  well	  end	  up	  categories	  as	  calcified	  and	  restrictive	  as	  the	  DSM’s.	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ethical	  cost.	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  keeping	  psychiatry	  focused	  on	  diagnostic	  kinds	  is	  the	  best	  way	  to	  avoid	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  mentally	  ill	  to	  their	  component	  parts,	  neglecting	  the	  phenomenological	  core	  of	  psychopathology	  in	  ways	  dangerous	  for	  patients	  (McLaren	  2011;	  Walter	  2013,	  Poland	  and	  Eckardt	  2013).	  There	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  the	  NIMH’s	  own	  assumptions	  about	  the	  proper	  targets	  for	  psychiatric	  explanation	  may	  become	  (in	  Hyman’s	  evocative	  term	  for	  the	  DSM)	  another	  “unintended	  epistemic	  prison”	  (2010,	  157).	  	  	   The	  NIMH	  has	  made	  little	  secret	  of	  its	  preference	  for	  analyses	  at	  the	  level	  of	  brain	  circuits,	  reasoning	  that	  it	  is	  at	  this	  level	  that	  science	  is	  most	  rapidly	  gaining	  insight	  into	  the	  underlying	  correlates	  of	  behavior	  (Insel	  et	  al.	  2010).	  This	  approach	  has	  garnered	  accusations	  that	  the	  RDoC	  is	  “mindless”	  (Frances	  2013),	  that	  is,	  aggressively	  biomedical	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  psychological	  perspectives.	  In	  response	  Bolton	  (2013)	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  NIMH’s	  claim	  that	  “all	  mental	  diseases	  are	  brain	  diseases”	  need	  not	  be	  reductionistic	  insofar	  as	  the	  brain	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  integrated	  into	  a	  complex	  network	  of	  causal	  relations	  that	  extend	  beyond	  the	  individual.	  However,	  especially	  in	  light	  the	  NIMH’s	  increasingly	  enthusiastic	  pursuit	  of	  basic	  science	  even	  as	  “fundamental	  and	  important	  questions	  regarding	  health	  services,	  psychosocial	  treatments,	  conceptual	  issues,	  public	  health,	  and	  patient	  initiatives	  remain	  marginally	  funded”	  (Sadler	  2013,	  29),	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  the	  NIMH	  will	  be	  truly	  ecumenical	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  research	  dollars	  across	  the	  columns	  of	  their	  matrix.	  	  	   The	  RDoC	  project’s	  purported	  reductionism	  differs	  in	  an	  important	  way	  from	  the	  epistemic	  bottleneck	  of	  the	  DSM,	  however,	  insofar	  as	  it	  increases	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  laboratory	  and	  the	  clinic	  rather	  than	  collapsing	  it.	  If	  the	  pretense	  that	  psychiatry’s	  scientific	  and	  practical	  objects	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same	  is	  abandoned,	  the	  fits	  and	  starts	  of	  the	  NIMH’s	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descriptive	  project	  need	  not	  immediately	  impact	  clinical	  nosology,	  and	  its	  reductive	  approach	  will	  not	  be	  directly	  imported	  into	  practice.	  Solomon	  has	  argued	  that	  while	  expert	  disagreement	  can	  be	  generative	  in	  science	  the	  value	  of	  consensus	  is	  higher	  in	  medicine,	  where	  the	  loss	  of	  epistemological	  authority	  can	  be	  dangerous	  (Solomon	  2014).	  Her	  claims	  are	  vindicated	  by	  the	  commonly	  expressed	  view	  even	  the	  minor	  modifications	  of	  diagnostic	  categories	  with	  each	  new	  edition	  of	  the	  DSM	  can	  be	  harmful	  to	  patients	  (Frances	  2009).	  	  As	  Schaffner	  has	  suggested,	  clinical	  research	  might	  continue	  to	  make	  progress	  on	  refining	  our	  methods	  of	  patient	  care	  while	  scientists	  work	  to	  reveal	  the	  complex	  and	  diverse	  “many-­‐many	  relations”	  that	  make	  validity	  such	  a	  challenge	  (Schaffner	  2012,	  184).	  	  However,	  if	  the	  
DSM	  stops	  playing	  its	  role	  as	  an	  epistemic	  hub	  (Kutschenko	  2011b),	  the	  integration	  of	  psychiatric	  knowledge	  into	  therapeutics	  will	  need	  to	  be	  re-­‐imagined.	  	  
5.	  Conclusion	  	   Diverse	  metaphysical	  orientations	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  diagnostic	  kinds’	  kindhood	  are	  compatible	  with	  the	  assumption	  of	  diagnostic	  discrimination.	  Debates	  among	  philosophers	  of	  psychiatry	  over	  psychiatric	  kinds	  have	  focused	  on	  appraising	  these	  possible	  metaphysical	  stances,	  and	  there	  has	  recently	  been	  much	  effort	  to	  resolve	  the	  metaphysical	  nature	  of	  psychiatric	  kinds	  (Kincaid	  and	  Sullivan	  2014).	  Insofar	  as	  the	  objects	  of	  diagnostic	  tests	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  either	  theoretical	  constructs	  or	  real	  entities,	  both	  realists	  and	  instrumentalists	  can	  beg	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  DSM’s	  diagnostic	  criteria	  are	  indeed	  discriminative.	  I	  conclude	  by	  noting	  that	  this	  project	  has	  distracted	  philosophers	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  optimism	  about	  the	  discrimination	  of	  the	  diagnostic	  criteria	  may,	  in	  some	  or	  all	  cases,	  be	  unwarranted.	  If	  diagnostic	  discrimination	  varies	  across	  the	  DSM’s	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categories,	  it	  renders	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  psychiatric	  kinds	  are	  (taken	  as	  a	  class)	  natural	  (or	  human,	  practical,	  constructed,	  etc.)	  an	  ill-­‐formed	  one.	  	  Since	  psychiatrists	  are,	  more	  and	  more,	  pursuing	  piecemeal	  causal	  explanations	  about	  constructs	  below	  the	  level	  of	  diagnoses,	  philosophers	  should	  follow	  Kincaid	  (2008)	  in	  leaving	  the	  question	  of	  diagnostic	  kindhood	  behind.	  Instead,	  philosophers	  can	  investigate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  psychiatry	  stabilizes	  its	  diverse	  objects	  of	  research	  across	  disciplinary	  boundaries	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  DSM’s	  authoritative	  voice	  (Sullivan	  2014).	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